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ABSTRACT: The development of nuclear «piles», soon called reactors, in the Manhattan Project 
provided a new technology for manufacturing radioactive isotopes. Radioisotopes, unstable 
variants of chemical elements that give off detectable radiation upon decay, were available 
in small amounts for use in research and therapy before World War II. In 1946, the U.S. go-
vernment began utilizing one of its first reactors, dubbed X-10 at Oak Ridge, as a production 
facility for radioisotopes available for purchase to civilian institutions. This program of the 
U.S. Atomic Energy Commission was meant to exemplify the peacetime dividends of atomic 
energy. The numerous requests from scientists outside the United States, however, sparked a 
political debate about whether the Commission should or even could export radioisotopes. 
This controversy manifested the tension in U.S. politics between scientific internationalism as 
a tool of diplomacy, associated with the aims of the Marshall Plan, and the desire to safeguard 
the country’s atomic monopoly at all costs, linked to American anti-Communism. This essay 
examines the various ways in which radioisotopes were used as political instruments —both 
by the U.S. federal government in world affairs, and by critics of the civilian control of atomic 
energy— in the early Cold War. 
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1. Introduction (*)
In the initial years of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), radioisotopes 
—produced and distributed by the agency for civilian use— became political 
instruments in struggles over the control of the atom. Even as the atomic 
bomb became the currency of the Cold War, radioisotopes represented 
the U.S. government’s efforts to harness the power of the atom for peace. 
The entry of the government into the supply of radioisotopes displaced 
informal exchange networks that cyclotron physicists had managed before 
the war. The Manhattan Project’s nuclear reactors produced a bountiful 
supply of radioactive isotopes, but access to them became entangled in 
the politics of national security. National security concerns resulted in a 
yearlong embargo on AEC-produced isotopes to foreign institutions, and 
continued to reverberate in Congressional politics and the national press 
into the early 1950s. In short, the nationalization of radioisotopes resulted 
in their politicization 1.
The Atomic Energy Act of 1946 was aimed at protecting or at least 
prolonging the American atomic monopoly; to this end it prohibited the 
export of «fissionable» materials. At the same time, the bill charged the 
new agency with promoting civilian uses of atomic energy, authorizing 
the distribution of reactor «byproduct materials» for peaceful uses 2. 
The government announcement of the availability of reactor-produced 
radioisotopes referred to «national distribution», and there was also a 
general assumption that domestic needs were to be filled first 3. But 
 (*) I received support for the research and writing from the U.S. National Science Foundation, grant 
SBE 98-75012; the National Endowment for Humanities through a Fellowship Award; and the 
National Institutes of Health, National Library of Medicine, grant number 5G13LM009100-2.
 1. This essay expands on material first presented in Creager, Angela N. H. Tracing the politics of 
changing postwar research practices: The export of «American» radioisotopes to European 
biologists. Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences. 2002; 
33C: 367-388.
 2. The Atomic Energy Act of 1946. In: Hewlett, Richard G.; Anderson, Oscar E., Jr. The new world: 
A history of the United States Atomic Energy Commission, Vol. 1: 1939–1946. University Park: 
Pennsylvania State University Press; 1962 [repr. Berkeley: University of California Press; 1990, 
p. 714-722, quote on p. 717].
 3. Availability of radioactive isotopes. Announcement from headquarters, Manhattan Project, 
Washington, D.C. Science. 1946; 103: 697-705; Foreign Distribution of Radioisotopes. Appendix 
A to Memorandum from J. B. Fisk to Carroll Wilson. 13 Aug 1947. AEC Records of the General 
Secretary, U.S. National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Record Group 
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foreign purchasers were not simply at the back of the line; they could not 
purchase the AEC’s isotopes at all. As one physicist reported at the end of 
1946, «Although no one in this country knows of any regulations against 
sending isotopes to foreign users, the conviction is wide spread abroad that 
scientists in this country are unwilling to share their materials» 4. 
Restrictions against sending radioisotopes abroad did not come from 
the leadership of the Manhattan Project; the Army was inclined to share the 
fruits of government reactors, at least with British and Canadian wartime 
collaborators. The Truman administration, however, took a dim view of 
the prospect of continuing any nuclear exchanges after the war. In the 
summer of 1947, the issue of foreign distribution came to a head among 
the five AEC Commissioners, who voted —without achieving unanimity— to 
allow export. They justified their decision by appealing to the Marshall Plan, 
not Anglo-American military cooperation. In announcing the program, 
Truman spoke of the foreign shipments as securing «greater international 
cooperation in the field of medical and biological research» 5. The first 
shipments of radioisotopes reached foreign hospitals and laboratories in 
the fall of 1947.
As the Cold War intensified, conservative watchdogs of the AEC 
monitored the agency’s foreign radioisotope shipments with suspicion. 
In 1949, their concerns about shipments of isotopes to Norway and 
Finland resulted in allegations that the agency’s distribution policy was 
undermining national security. The Commission never altered its policy 
—in fact, the agency expanded the purview of exports to include industrial 
shipments in the early 1950s— but these shipments featured in the 1949 
Congressional Investigative Hearings of the agency, which took a toll on 
the agency’s leadership. Just a few months later, the explosion of the first 
Soviet atomic bomb shattered any illusions that the U.S. could maintain 
its nuclear monopoly. In addition, the governments of Britain and Canada 
began selling radioisotopes to foreign purchasers, with fewer restrictions 
326, Entry 67A [hereafter AEC Secretary Records], box 46, folder 3, Foreign Distribution of 
Radioisotopes. Vol. 1, p. 8.
 4. Evans, Robley D. to: Robert F. Bacher. 31 Dec 1946. AEC Secretary Records. Box 46. Folder 3. 
Foreign Distribution of Radioisotopes. Vol. 1.
 5. Telegram from President Truman to: Cowdry, E. V. 3 Sep 1947. Printed with Press Release. 4 Sep 
1947. United States Atomic Energy Commission announces first shipment of radioisotopes to a 
foreign country. AEC Secretary Records. Box 47. Folder 6. Foreign Distribution of Radioisotopes. 
Vol. 2.
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than the AEC. U.S. policy based on denying radioactive materials and 
nuclear technology to other nations had become pointless. In the early 
1950s, President Eisenhower took a new approach to American nuclear 
supremacy in his Atoms for Peace program, shifting the emphasis from 
guarding secrets to sharing technology. His depiction of radioisotopes as 
tools of international diplomacy, in conjunction with 1954 revisions to 
the Atomic Energy Act permitting greater (though controlled) access to 
nuclear materials and technology, finally quelled suspicions about foreign 
shipments 6.
Two features of the politicization of radioisotopes in the immediate 
postwar years stand out. First is a recurrent symbolism that divided 
civilian uses from military uses along disciplinary lines, with biomedicine 
perceived as inherently civilian and physics and engineering as military. 
The popular perception that nuclear physics research was unavoidably 
related to atomic weapons development led the AEC to prioritize medical 
therapy and biological research in the export program, which the agency 
represented as a humanitarian endeavor 7. Nonetheless, a few shipments 
to foreign physical scientists, especially those to countries in Russia’s 
sphere of influence, drew the alarm of the agency’s Congressional critics. 
They alleged that these radioisotopes could end up in the hands of Soviet 
government to further military developments, undermining American 
national security. 
Second (and relatedly), critics of these shipments, including dissenting 
Commissioner Lewis Strauss, insinuated that the sharing of nuclear materials 
in the form of isotopes was equivalent to the dissemination of nuclear 
information, which was strictly forbidden under the 1946 Atomic Energy 
Act. To the degree that nuclear information and nuclear materials appeared 
inseparable, this weakened the perceived legitimacy of isotope exports. 
While the dream of a lasting U.S. atomic monopoly persisted, conservatives 
used anxieties about the loss of the country’s nuclear secrets to denounce 
the international circulation of the AEC’s radioisotopes.
 6. See Krige, John. Atoms for peace, scientific internationalism, and scientific intelligence. Osiris. 
2006; 21: 161-181.
 7. See Creager, Angela N. H.; Santesmases, María Jesús. Radiobiology in the atomic age: Changing 
research practices and policies in comparative perspective. Journal of the History of 
Biology. 2006; 39: 637-647; Santesmases, María Jesús. Peace propaganda and biomedical 
experimentation: Influential uses of radioisotopes in endrocrinology and molecular genetics 
in Spain (1947–1971). Journal of the History of Biology. 2006; 39: 765–794.
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2. The politics of foreign distribution of «American» isotopes
From the fall of 1945 to the spring of 1946, legislation over atomic energy 
stalled in Congress. One of the sticking points concerned the level of 
scientific and technical exchange that the U.S. would have with its former 
allies 8. Roosevelt and Churchill had negotiated the so-called Quebec 
Agreement in 1943, permitting exchanges of technical information between 
the Americans, British, and Canadian participants in the bomb project 9. 
The British government hoped to continue Anglo-American cooperation 
in the postwar period. However, Truman’s administration viewed the 
sharing of technical information as antithetical to the American aim of 
maintaining a nuclear monopoly. The U.S. Congress overwhelming agreed: 
the McMahon Bill that President Truman signed into law on August 1, 1946 
forbade the government «to share information about nuclear technology 
with any other power» 10. 
The bill also authorized distribution of «byproduct material», enabling 
the Manhattan Engineering District (MED) to commence their radioisotope 
distribution program. On August 2, 1946, the first radioisotope «shipment» 
was made in front of the MED’s graphite reactor in Oak Ridge, Tennessee, 
with dozens of newspapermen crowded around the stage taking notes and 
snapping pictures 11. Shipments that had been pending all summer began 
being sent out, even as the confirmation hearings for the Commission’s first 
chair, David E. Lilienthal (former head of the Tennessee Valley Authority, 
or TVA) resurfaced the contentious political debates over atomic energy. 
On September 9, 1946, physicist J. D. Cockcroft wrote to General 
Leslie Groves about the status of outstanding requests for isotopes from 
 8. See Mallard, Grégoire. Quand l’expertise se heurte au pouvoir souverain: La nation américaine 
face à la prolifération nucléaire, 1945–1953. Sociologie du Travail. 2006; 48: 367-389; Mallard, 
Grégoire. The atomic confederacy: Europe’s quest for nuclear weapons and the making of 
the new world order [Ph.D. dissertation]. Princeton University; 2008.
 9. Hewlett, Richard G.; Duncan, Francis. Atomic shield: A history of the United States Atomic 
Energy Commission, Vol. 2: 1947-1952. University Park: Pennsylvania University Press; 1969 
[repr. Berkeley: University of California Press; 1990. Chapter 9].
 10. Ball, S. J. Military nuclear relations between the United States and Great Britain under the terms 
of the McMahon Act, 1946–1958. The Historical Journal. 1995; 38: 439-454 (440).
 11. This reactor was the main site for the AEC’s radioisotope production and distribution. See 
Creager, Angela N. H. Nuclear energy in the service of biomedicine: The U.S. Atomic Energy 
Commission’s radioisotope program, 1946–1950. Journal of the History of Biology. 2006; 39: 
649-684.
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the British atomic energy installation, Harwell. One such request, for 10 
millicuries of phosphorus-32 for biological research, had been transmitted 
over five months earlier. Groves viewed these requests favorably, writing 
Cockroft that «it is possible to approve the supply of radioactive isotopes 
to the United Kingdom and Canada without awaiting appointment of 
the United States Atomic Energy Commission» 12. He sent an identical 
letter to W. B. Lewis at Chalk River, Canada, in response to radioisotope 
requests from scientists there 13. These requests from former collaborators 
in the American atomic bomb project drew upon the wartime precedent 
of technical cooperation. As it developed, the purchase orders were not 
received in time to permit shipment before the New Year, so the Army 
deferred action to the new AEC 14. 
At midnight on December 31, 1946, most of the infrastructure of the 
MED was legally transferred to the civilian AEC. The new agency was headed 
by a board, or Commission, of five Presidentially-nominated individuals. The 
five Commissioners —Lilienthal (its chair), Robert Bacher, Lewis Strauss, 
Sumner T. Pike, and William W. Waymack— met for the first time on 
January 2, 1947 15. They were soon updated on the program launched 
by the MED to supply radioisotopes for civilian use. Colonel Kenneth 
D. Nichols, the Army liaison to the AEC selected by General Groves, 
explained that domestic requests were already being filled, but action on 
foreign requests had been postponed. He emphasized the special status of 
requests from wartime allies, recommending that the AEC fill the requests 
 12. Groves, L. G. to: Cockcroft, J. D. at Harwell, England; Groves, L. G. to: Lewis, W. B. at Chalk River, 
Canada. 24 Oct 1946. National Archives and Record Administration Southeast Region. Record 
Group 326 (AEC). Acc. No. 68A1096. Oak Ridge Operations Office Laboratory and University 
Division Official Files, 1944–1966. Box 13. Folder Isotopes-3. The request for phosphorus-32 
had been transmitted by Cockroft on behalf of the UK’s Medical Research Council.
 13. Nichols, K. D. to: Wilson, Carroll L. 15 Jan 1947. AEC Secretary Records. Box 46. Folder 3. Foreign 
Distribution of Radioisotopes. Vol. 1.
 14. Huddleson, E. E. Jr., to: Wilson, Carroll L. Memorandum Distribution of radioisotopes abroad. 5 
March 1947. AEC Secretary Records. Box 46. Folder 3. Foreign Distribution of Radioisotopes, 
Vol. 1.
 15. Robert F. Bacher was nuclear physicist from Cornell who had been a division director at Los 
Alamos; Lewis L. Strauss was an admiral and financier with a strong background and interest 
in nuclear physics; Sumner T. Pike was a businessman and former member of the Securities 
and Exchange Commission and Office of Price Administration. William W. Waymack was a 
newspaper editor and deputy chairman of the board of the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago. 
See Hewlett and Duncan, n. 9, p. 1-6.
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from Chalk River and Harwell 16. There were many other foreign requests; 
by March of 1947, individuals from institutions at twenty foreign countries 
had asked to purchase isotopes from the U.S. government 17.
As the Commission saw it, their position in the forefront of the 
radioisotope field had been «forced upon it more or less by accident», 
as a non-military application of their nuclear reactors 18. Paul Aebersold, 
who directed the agency’s Oak Ridge-based isotope distribution program, 
advocated opening it to foreign purchasers. But the Commission hesitated to 
authorize international distribution, even though a memorandum prepared 
on «the case against sale of radioisotopes abroad» rebutted the most 
obvious objections 19. Their lack of decisiveness on the question of isotope 
distribution was partly attributable to political battles on other fronts. The 
contentious confirmation hearings for Commissioners lasted into March, 
and focused on national security issues. Senator Robert A. Taft of Ohio 
described Lilienthal as «too ‘soft’ on issues connected with communism and 
Soviet Russia» 20. That spring, reports surfaced in the press that «secret 
files» had been lost or stolen from the AEC’s laboratories. Critics of the 
AEC called for a military takeover of the agency on account of its ineptitude 
in managing security —despite the fact that the some of the alleged thefts 
had taken place while the labs were under control of the Army 21.
At the beginning of June, the General Advisory Committee (GAC) 
of the AEC discussed whether the agency should make isotopes available 
to researchers abroad. The GAC, headed by J. Robert Oppenheimer, was 
composed entirely of physical scientists; the group wielded substantial 
influence on the Commission in its early years. They strongly supported 
foreign distribution of the AEC’s radioisotopes, arguing it would «prove that 
this democratic county will do all it can, consistent with its own defense 
 16. Nichols, K. D. to: Wilson, Carroll L. 15 Jan 1947 and 21 Jan 1947. Memoranda. AEC Secretary 
Records Box 46. Folder 3. Foreign Distribution of Radioisotopes. Vol. 1. 
 17. Haywood, C. G. to: Bennett Boskey. 31 Jan 1947. Memorandum. AEC Secretary Records. Box 46. 
Folder 3. Foreign Distribution of Radioisotopes. Vol. 1. 
 18. Foreign distribution of radioisotopes, 13 Aug 1947, Appendix A to: Wilson, Carroll L. Memorandum 
to J. B. Fisk. AEC Secretary Records. Box 46. Folder 3. Foreign Distribution of Radioisotopes. 
Vol. 1.
 19. Shurcliff, W. A. to: Boskey, Bennett. 14 May 1947. Memorandum. Bourke B. Hickenlooper papers, 
Herbert Hoover Presidential Library. Series 3G. Joint Atomic Energy Committee [hereafter 
Hickenlooper Papers]. Box 24. Folder Isotopes Jan-Aug 1947.
 20. As quoted in Hewlett; Duncan, n. 9, p. 11. 
 21. Hewlett; Duncan, n. 9, p. 88-95.
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and security, to improve the public welfare and raise the standard of living 
throughout the world» 22.
On June 5, 1947, the Commission considered the GAC’s recommendation 
that it release radioisotopes to foreign scientists but failed to reach consensus. 
Cited in their minutes are a variety of «pro» and «con» factors. The main 
perceived risk was that sharing isotopes might compromise the U.S.’s military 
supremacy. As the minutes put it, the advances in basic research enabled 
by radioisotopes could give «possible advantages, military and otherwise,» 
to foreign nations 23. None of the radioisotopes under the proposed export 
program could directly assist in the development of atomic weapons. 
However, obtaining experience with isotopes would help scientists in other 
nations develop atomic energy, and might contribute to the pursuit of 
radiological warfare. There was also the problem of controlling secondary 
distribution. Strauss had already observed that if the agency was unwilling 
to ship radioisotopes to Russia, it should not let them outside American 
borders at all, since it could not control their ultimate destination 24.
On the other side of the ledger, there were many advantages to a 
policy of controlled sharing. First, publications from foreign scientists 
using radioisotopes would benefit American researchers. Second, making 
radioisotopes available outside the U.S., as a step away from American 
isolationism, would generate political goodwill among foreign nations. It 
would reinforce the country’s commitment to scientific internationalism 
and show that the AEC was not dominated by the military. As Lilienthal 
saw it, restoring a sense of the «international fraternity of knowledge» was 
crucial to shoring up alliances with European «friends», in the spirit of the 
 22. Draft of proposed public statement on release of isotopes abroad. Prepared from discussions 
of the General Advisory Committee, 1 June 1947. J. Robert Oppenheimer Papers, Manuscript 
Division. Library of Congress [hereafter Oppenheimer Papers]. Box 176. Folder GAC-Radioisotopes, 
Foreign Distribution.
 23. Minutes from 62nd AEC Meeting, 5 June 1947, AEC Secretary Records. Box 46. Folder 3. Foreign 
Distribution of Radioisotopes. Vol. 1.
 24. Strauss, Lewis L. to Bacher, Robert F. 23 May 1947. Memorandum. Lewis L. Strauss papers. 
Herbert Hoover Presidential Library. Series 5: Atomic Energy Commission [hereafter Strauss 
Papers]. Box 46. Folder Isotopes Jan-Aug 1947. Interestingly, there is also a copy in the 
Hickenlooper Papers. Box 24. Folder Isotopes Jan-Aug1947. This is one of several pieces 
of evidence suggesting that Strauss was passing information to Hickenlooper to generate 
Congressional concern about the radioisotope exports.
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Marshall Plan 25. Third, sharing of radioisotopes might help the U.S. negotiate 
access to uranium ores, needed for continued nuclear weapons production, 
that were located in other countries or their colonial possessions 26. Fourth, 
the radioisotope program could be used to gain information about the 
nuclear programs in other countries, bolstering national security through 
intelligence. As one memorandum put it:
«It will presumably be useful to the United States to know that certain 
foreigners are busy with no more mischievous work than radioisotope research; 
conversely, the absence of certain expected names from the list of applicants 
might suggest inquiry into the possibility that these men are employed against 
the interests of the United States» 27.
There was an element of urgency: the political benefits would be greatest 
if the U.S. acted before other nations developed production-scale nuclear 
reactors with which to supply radioisotopes. 
During the summer of 1947, while the Commissioners equivocated 
about radioisotope export, scientists became increasingly frustrated with 
the AEC’s restrictive policy. One American scientist who was working in 
the Institute for Theoretical Physics in Copenhagen conveyed the damage 
being done to reputation of the U.S. overseas: 
«I have just returned from two international scientific congresses, one 
in Stockholm and one in Oxford and was really amazed to find European 
biologists regarding America as somewhat the same as Soviet Russia insofar as 
scientific matters were being handled. It is certainly not a flattering comparison 
but one cannot deny many of the facts brought out. At neither congress was 
a paper of any importance regarding the biological uses of radioisotopes read, 
this in spite of the fact that this new tool has been called one of the most 
significant advances in biology» 28.
 25. Lilienthal, David E. The atomic energy years: The journals of David E. Lilienthal. Vol. 2, New 
York: Harper & Row; 1964, p. 190-191 [ journal entry for 7 June 1947]. On the significance 
of science in American-European relations, see Krige, John. American hegemony and the 
postwar reconstruction of science in Europe. Cambridge: MIT Press; 2006.
 26. Haywood, n. 17. 
 27. Foreign Distribution of Radioisotopes, n. 18.
 28. Mullins, Lorin J. to: Aebersold, Paul C. 1 Aug 1947. Letter. AEC Secretary Records. Box 46. Folder 
3. Foreign Distribution of Radioisotopes. Vol. 1.
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Another referred to British biologists, who were relying on the Cavendish 
cyclotron for minute supplies of phosphorus-32 and sodium-24, as «materially 
handicapped by the almost complete lack of isotopes» 29. The discontent 
of scientists spilled into the press on July 21, 1947 through an editorial 
entitled «Scientific Monopoly» in the New York Herald Tribune (whose 
internationalist orientation reflected its liberal Republican ownership). 
The piece criticized the AEC for changing national policy from openness in 
sharing radioisotopes to withholding them. «Before the war, when isotopes 
were made in minute quantities by cyclotrons, America was magnanimous 
enough to ship tiny amounts to foreign scientists; today, when the supply 
is comparatively huge, the nation holds on to it grimly» 30. Even the supply 
from cyclotrons was restricted: E. O. Lawrence, who had sent isotopes to 
European scientists such as George Hevesy in the late 1930s, could not 
resume after the war because his laboratory was supported by the Army 
and then the AEC.
By mid-1947, Oak Ridge had ninety-six unfilled foreign requests 
for radioisotopes, of which seventy-three were for medical research and 
therapy. Nearly half were from England and continental Europe, including 
requests from Belgium, Denmark, France, Holland, Italy, Portugal, Spain, 
and Sweden 31. The agency had drawn up a provisional policy that would 
allow sales of twenty-eight different radioisotopes of nineteen elements 
to foreign scientists. The list featured those isotopes that were of greatest 
interest to biomedical researchers: carbon-14, calcium-45, iodine-131, 
phosphorus-32, sodium-24, and sulfur-35 32. Foreign distribution of naturally 
radioactive elements —those with atomic number higher than 83— would 
not be authorized, and the only fission product that could be exported was 
iodine-131, on account of its importance in medical therapy. 
 29. Evans, Robley D. to Bacher, Robert F. 15 July 1947. Letter. AEC Secretary Records. Box 46. Folder 
3. Foreign Distribution of Radioisotopes. Vol. 1.
 30. Anonymous. Scientific monopoly. New York Herald Tribune. 21 July 1947. Copy in AEC Secretary 
Records, box 46, Folder Foreign Distribution of Radioisotopes. Vol. 1. On the New York Herald 
Tribune, see Kluger, Richard. The paper: The life and death of the New York Herald Tribune. 
New York: Alfred A. Knopf; 1986.
 31. Appendix. List of Foreign Countries from which Requests for Isotopes Have Been Received. 
AEC Secretary Records. Box 46. Folder 3. Foreign Distribution of Radioisotopes. Vol. 1. 
 32. Manley, J. H. to: Carroll L. Wilson. 24 June 1947. Memorandum. AEC Secretary Records. Box 46. 
Folder 3. Foreign Distribution of Radioisotopes. Vol. 1. 
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On August 19, 1947, when the Commission finally voted on the 
pending proposal, the tally was four-to-one in favor of radioisotope export. 
Strauss, the holdout, did not believe that the safeguards proposed by the 
AEC would prevent radioisotopes from being used to military advantage 
by other nations. This risk trumped all other benefits in his view 33. In the 
eyes of the other four Commissioners, the damage to the credibility of the 
United States if it failed to export radioisotopes outweighed any risk: 
«The United States should take the leadership in this matter rather than 
reluctantly follow the actions of Canada or Britain. By denying the foreign 
distribution of radioisotopes at this time the United States will be giving 
unfriendly countries a propaganda weapon that might be more hurtful to 
national security than would be any possible harm in the release of radioisotopes 
under appropriately safeguarded conditions» 34. 
The issue of competition from other national atomic energy facilities was 
acute; as the minutes noted, since the Commissioner’s last discussion of the 
issue, the first Canadian reactor at Chalk River had become operational. 
The Department of State approved the AEC’s policy at the end of 
August 35.
At the opening of the Fourth Annual International Cancer Research 
Congress in St. Louis on September 3, 1947, President Truman announced 
that the American-produced radioisotopes would be made available to foreign 
scientists «principally for medical and biological research». The decision was 
framed as enabling the «open, impartial, and truly international character of 
medical research [to] carry over into the realm of other problems of world 
concern» 36. The emphasis was on internationalism and humanitarianism 
as manifested in medicine and biology, though the AEC did not prohibit 
shipments to foreign scientists working outside of these fields. 
Just a few weeks later, negotiations at the United Nations on the Baruch 
plan for the international control of atomic weapons reached a stalemate, 
as the Soviet Union would not agree to the terms set by the U.S. Strauss 
 33. Hewlett; Duncan, n. 9, p. 109-110. 
 34. Minutes of the Atomic Energy Commission on Foreign Distribution of Radioisotopes. 19 Aug 1947. 
p. 3, copy in Oppenheimer Papers. Box 186. Folder Isotopes–Miscellaneous Information.
 35. Summary of actions at Commissioners’ meetings re: foreign distribution of radioisotopes. AEC 
Secretary Records. Box 47. Folder 6, Foreign Distribution of Radioisotopes. Vol. 2. 
 36. Telegram from President Truman, n. 5. 
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drafted a memorandum to his fellow Commissioners asking them to consider 
suspending all foreign shipments until the issue of international control 
had been resolved 37. His plea was ineffective. Determined to monitor 
the program himself, Strauss asked the AEC’s manager to begin sending 
him a «record at the end of each month which will show the isotopes 
that we export, with a description of the isotope, the amount in units of 
radioactivity or weight, or both, the country of destination, the consignee, 
and the purpose for which requested» 38. 
The AEC’s protocol for foreign shipment requests differed markedly 
from that for domestic purchasers. Foreign countries had to be approved 
for the program by the Department of State. This involved going through 
the usual diplomatic channels to make the request to the Secretary of State, 
and designating a U.S.-based representative to act on the country’s behalf 
in handling requests. This agent, which could be a diplomatic official, 
company, or an individual, was expected to take care of a wide variety 
of tasks: «arrangements for shipments, payment, forwarding of technical 
circulars to interested scientists in his country and [submitting] progress 
reports» 39. Other, less bureaucratic issues came into play for certain foreign 
applicants. Before «final affirmative action» could be taken on «requests 
from Russia or Russian dominated countries», they had to be referred to 
the AEC’s General Manager for approval 40.
The AEC required foreign recipients to report semiannually on the 
results obtained with the radioisotopes, to use the reagents only for the 
purposes specified in the application, to abide by the same laboratory 
safety guidelines as domestic users, and to «permit qualified scientists of 
all nations to visit their institutions and freely obtain information about 
 37. Strauss, Lewis L. to: Bacher, Robert. 23 Sep 1947. Draft memorandum. Re: Has a mistake been 
made in deciding to export isotopes to foreign countries? Includes a note indicating that the 
draft was shown to the three other Commissioners on 24 and 25 Sep 1947. Strauss Papers. 
Box 46. Folder Isotopes Sep-Dec 1947. Quote from p. 9.
 38. Strauss, Lewis L. to Wilson, Carroll L. 18 Sep 1947. Memorandum. Strauss Papers. Box 46. Folder 
Isotopes 1947 Sep-Dec.
 39. Press release: 27 nations qualify to receive radioisotopes from Atomic Energy Commission. AEC 
Secretary Records. Box 47. Folder 6. Foreign Distribution of Radioisotopes. Vol. 2.
 40. Franklin, John C. to: Wilson, Carroll L. 26 Sep 1947. Memorandum: Procedure for handling foreign 
requests for radioisotopes. AEC Secretary Records. Box 47. Folder 6. Foreign Distribution of 
Radioisotopes. Vol. 2.
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the work, in accordance with the best scientific tradition» 41. For countries 
interested in building up their own atomic energy capabilities, the policy had 
a coercive edge —receiving AEC isotopes meant opening up laboratories 
to American visitors, including the scientific attachés the U.S. government 
was appointing in various European countries 42. In other words, it meant 
acquiescing to U.S. intelligence-gathering.
3. Destinations and complications
From the fall of 1947 to the end of 1948, the AEC sent out 356 shipments 
of radioisotopes to various laboratories and treatment centers around the 
world, beginning with eleven shipments to Australia. (See Figure 1) Nearly 
seventy percent went to Europe and the United Kingdom. Sweden was the 
largest consumer, having received sixty-two shipments, followed by England 
with fifty-eight. Beyond Australia and New Zealand, the other non-European 
countries whose institutions received shipments were Argentina, Chile, Peru, 
and South Africa 43. Approximately 90% of the uses of isotopes by foreign 
recipients were in the fields of medical therapy or physiological research. 
The other ten percent of research uses was accounted for by «fundamental 
research problems in physics, chemistry, and plant physiology» 44.
The AEC’s official list of exported isotopes is incomplete in one 
important way. On October 1, 1948, the AEC authorized shipments of 
stable and radioactive isotopes to the Canadian and British atomic energy 
installations at Chalk River and Harwell. These shipments were part of the 
Technical Cooperation Program, as specified by the 1947 modus vivendi 
agreements between the U.S., the U.K., and Canada 45. Negotiations for 
reinstituting some level of Anglo-American nuclear cooperation became 
 41. U.S. Atomic Energy Commission. Third semiannual report. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government 
Printing Office; 1948, p. 8.
 42. Excerpted minutes, attached to memorandum from T. O. Jones to Edwin E. Huddleson, Jr. 16 
Dec 1948. AEC Secretary Records. Box 47. Folder 6. Foreign Distribution of Radioisotopes. 
Vol. 2.
 43. Monthly reports of foreign shipments–radioisotopes. Report No. 16. Dec 1948. AEC Secretary 
Records. Box 46. Folder 2. Monthly Reports of Foreign Shipments of Radioisotopes.
 44. U.S. Atomic Energy Commission. Isotopes: A three-year summary of distribution with extensive 
bibliography. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office; 1949, p. 24.
 45. Hewlett and Duncan, n. 9, chapters 9 and 10.
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urgent once the U.S. government realized that half of the uranium ore from 
the Belgian Congo was going to the British, and this would soon hamper the 
American nuclear weapons program. The Technical Cooperation Program, 
like radioisotope exports, remained a sore point with Lewis Strauss and 
other national security watchdogs. The radioisotope shipments to Chalk 
River and Harwell were not numerous —there were three to the U.K. and 
fifteen to Canada between October 1, 1948 and August 1, 1949. Even 
counting these covert shipments, the slant towards applications in biology 
and medicine was stronger in the foreign distribution program than in the 
domestic program 46.
 46. Two years into the program, the AEC estimated that 90% of the foreign shipments were 
being used in «the fields of medical therapy or physiological research». Press release: AEC 
sends radioisotopes to 22 nations for research and therapy. AEC Secretary Records. Box 47. 
Folder 6. Foreign Distribution of Radioisotopes. Vol. 2.
Figure 1. A world map indicating the destination of all foreign shipments of radioisotopes from the 
U.S. Atomic Energy Commission during the first twenty-two months of the program. Reproduced 
from the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission. Isotopes: A three-year summary of distribution with 
extensive bibliography. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office; 1949, p. 59.
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In December 1948, the Commission approved an application to ship 
radiophosphorus to Finland, despite the fact that Finland had negotiated 
a mutual assistance pact with the U.S.S.R. a few months earlier. The State 
Department, which emphasized that «Finland is not behind the iron 
curtain», sought to encourage the country’s independence from Soviet 
influence 47. Including Finland in the radioisotope program would signal its 
place among the European democracies whose economies the U.S. sought 
to assist. Again Lewis Strauss dissented 48. 
This action added to several other controversial decisions and allegations 
causing problems in Congress for the AEC. First, the Commission decided 
in 1948 that its postdoctoral fellowships in the biomedical and physical 
sciences would be open to applicants irrespective of their political affiliations. 
The subsequent award of an AEC fellowship to a scientist with a record of 
membership in the Communist Party became a lightning rod for criticism 49. 
Second, the JCAE raised concerns about the publication of the Commission’s 
fifth semiannual report to Congress, which contained detailed information 
about their facilities and programs —too much for politicians eager to see 
the country protect its atomic knowledge 50. Third, another security breach 
was reported on May 17, this time concerning some fissionable uranium 
missing from Argonne National Laboratory. This allegation spurred the JCAE 
to launch an investigation of the AEC, to «make a complete inquiry into 
the grave charges which have been made» 51. Making his position clear-cut, 
Hickenlooper called for Lilienthal’s resignation on May 22 52.
 47. Finland. Policy Statement, U.S. Department of State. 2 Sep 1948. AEC Secretary Records. Box 
47. Folder 6. Foreign Distribution of Radioisotopes. Vol. 2, p. 5.
 48. Summary of actions at Commissioners’ meetings re: foreign distribution of radioisotopes. AEC 
Secretary Records, box 47, folder 6, Foreign Distribution of Radioisotopes. Vol. 2. See also 
Krige, John. The politics of phophorus-32: A cold war fable based on fact. Historical Studies 
in the Physical and Biological Sciences. 2005; 36 (1): 71-91.
 49. Kaiser, David. Cold war requisitions, scientific manpower, and the production of American 
physicists after World War II. Historical Studies in the Physical and Biological Sciences. 2002; 
33 (1): 131-159, especially p. 140-141. The Commission lost this battle; the appropriations 
bill Congress passed that summer and President Roosevelt signed on 25 Aug 1949 required 
FBI clearance for all AEC fellowship applicants. Hewlett and Duncan, n. 9, p. 451.
 50. This despite the fact that much of this information, including locations of facilities, had 
previously been published in the Smyth Report. Lilienthal, n. 25, p. 488-489 ( journal entry 
for March 20, 1949); Hewlett and Duncan, n. 9, p. 352.
 51. Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. Investigation into the United States Atomic Energy Project: 
Hearings Before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. 81st Congress. 1st session. Washington, 
D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office; 1949. Part 1. 26 May 1949, p. 1.
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Even before the hearings began on May 26, 1949, critics within and 
without the agency positioned themselves. Strauss’s surveillance of the 
foreign shipment records turned up exactly the sort of suspicious export 
he had hoped to find —a shipment of radioactive iron to the Norwegian 
Defense Research Establishment 53. He wrote the other Commissioners that 
he thought this shipment violated provisions of the Atomic Energy Act 54. 
Given Strauss’s close connections to Hickenlooper, this was a warning 
signal of trouble ahead. A few days later, on May 24, 1949 the AEC 
sent out a press release defending their foreign distribution program 55. 
Hickenlooper marked up his own copy, underlining the emphases on exports 
for «medical and biological research,» a slant that he knew sat uneasily with 
the shipment to Norway. 
The Investigative Hearings focused alarm on the issue of isotope 
exports. On June 8, Hickenlooper charged that the AEC’s authorization 
certain shipments «clearly violates the scope and limitations of the isotope 
distribution program as announced by the President on September 3, 
1947» 56. More specifically, the initial policy was that «isotopes would 
be made for biological and medical research almost exclusively» whereas 
a shipment of radioactive iron had been sent on April 28, 1949 to the 
Norwegian Defense Research Establishment at Kjeller for metallurgical 
research on high-temperature steel, which might be used in jet engines 57. 
Adding to the sense of urgency, the New York Times reported shortly 
before the hearings that Norway was pressing to build a nuclear reactor 
at Kjeller 58. Hickenlooper raised concerns about other shipments as well, 
three to Finland for research in the physical sciences, plus other shipments 
that had been sent to the Joliot-Curie laboratory in France: 
 52. Hewlett; Duncan, n. 9, p. 358.
 53. See Strauss’s marked-up shipment records in Strauss Papers. Box 46. Folder Isotopes 1949. 
 54. Strauss, Lewis L. to: the Commissioners. 18 May 1949. Memorandum. Strauss Papers. Box 46. 
Folder Isotopes 1949. 
 55. AEC press release: Foreign distribution of radioisotopes. 24 May 1949. Hickenlooper Papers. 
Box 24. Folder Isotopes 1949.
 56. Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, n. 51, Part 5. 8 June 1949, p. 204.
 57. This was shipment n. 508, one milicurie of high specific activity iron-59. Monthly Reports of 
Foreign Shipments–Radioisotopes. Report No. 20. Apr 1949. AEC Secretary Records. Box 46. 
Folder 2. Monthly Reports of Foreign Shipments of Radioisotopes. 
 58. Norwegian Defense Board pressing an atomic pile. The New York Times. 29 May 1949. 
Hickenlooper Papers. Box 24. Folder Isotopes 1949. The Norwegian reactor at Kjeller went 
critical in 1951.
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«I call attention to the fact that the social and political views of Madame 
Curie and her husband have been widely publicized not only in Europe but 
in the United States. I call attention to the fact that once these isotopes leave 
our possession we lose control of the actual use to which they may be put and 
we lose control over the destination of either the isotopes or the information 
gained therefrom. I also call attention to the fact that many of these isotopes 
can, in fact, be used for the development of information that will not be used 
for the benefit of mankind nor for humanitarian purposes» 59.
According to Hickenlooper, these shipments directly violated the Atomic 
Energy Act which banned exchange of «information with other nations 
with respect to the use of atomic energy for industrial purposes» until 
international safeguards had been established by Congress 60. 
Strauss aligned himself publicly with Hickenlooper. As he stated 
while testifying that same day, «The question of whether indiscriminate 
dissemination of knowledge on atomic energy ought to be made during 
the period of a cold war is the real point at issue» 61. By referring to the 
dissemination of «knowledge», rather than isotopic materials, Strauss 
insinuated that exporting radioisotopes abrogated the Atomic Energy 
Act’s prohibition against sharing nuclear information. Strauss also failed 
to acknowledge distinctions among the alleged violations: Finland was 
suspicious on account of its pact with the Soviet Union, France owing to 
Joliot being an outspoken communist, and Norway because of its military 
research —this despite the fact that Norway was a U.S. ally and a founding 
member of the North American Treaty Organization (NATO) 62. In their 
loathing of Lilienthal, he and Hickenlooper simply saw red.
Hickenlooper’s accusation was reported in newspapers the next day under 
by-lines such as «U.S. Isotope Export Held Dangerous» 63. The New York 
Times reported that the accusation «threw the Joint Congressional Committee 
into severe dispute at the resumption of hearings in Mr. Hickenlooper’s 
 59. Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, n. 51. Part 5. 8 June 1949, p. 207. On research with 
radioisotopes in France, see Gaudillière, Jean-Paul. Normal pathways: Controlling isotopes 
and building biomedical research in postwar France. Journal of the History of Biology. 2006; 
39: 737–764.
 60. Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, n. 51, Part 5. 8 June 1949, p. 206-207.
 61. Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, n. 51, Part 6. 9 June 1949, p. 236.
 62. On Norway and NATO, see Krige, n. 25.
 63. Los Angeles Times. 9 June 1949: 14.
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‘incredible mismanagement’ case against David E. Lilienthal» 64. Oppenheimer 
testified on June 13 in defense of the radioisotope export decisions of the 
AEC, but Congressmen and Senators asked him repeatedly whether the 
radioisotopes being sent to Europeans might find their way into the hands 
of the Russians and speed the development of atomic weapons behind the 
iron curtain. Oppenheimer responded dismissively, suggesting that isotopes 
were no more useful to the military development of atomic energy than a 
shovel 65. Yet, just three months later, the announcement that the Russians 
had detonated their first atomic bomb reinforced suspicions that disloyal 
Americans scientists had given away the country’s nuclear «secrets» 66.
4. Conclusion: Lost market share
Richard Hewlett and Francis Duncan argue that the summer 1949 Investigative 
Hearings, in conjunction with the first Soviet atomic test, marked the end 
of the period of postwar hope that peaceful applications of atomic energy 
would predominate over military uses. This changed the symbolism of 
radioisotopes in two ways. First, to the degree that the radioisotope program 
exemplified the new era of peaceful uses of atomic energy, it began to 
appear a mirage in light of the intensifying Cold War. As the successor 
to the Manhattan Project, the AEC had never ceased being the supplier 
of nuclear weapons, but the vision that it might develop into an atomic 
TVA faded as the reality of an arms race with the Soviet Union sunk in. 
Second, the new reality that the U.S. no longer held an atomic monopoly 
made it harder for conservatives to portray the export of radioisotopes 
as jeopardizing the country’s supremacy. The establishment of foreign 
radioisotope distribution programs by Britain and Canada eased the political 
acceptability of this expanded program in the U.S. by competing with it. 
 64. Morris, John D. Isotopes shipment to Norse stirs row. The New York Times. 9 June 1949: 1.
 65. Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, n. 51. Part 7. 13 June 1949. p. 282. John Krige (n. 48) notes 
that it was at this time that Strauss’s hatred of Oppenheimer hardened, contributing to 
the humiliating withdrawal of Oppenheimer’s security clearance when Strauss headed the 
Commission in 1954. 
 66. Kaiser, David I. The atomic secret in red hands? American suspicions of theoretical physicists 
during the early cold war. Representations. 2005; 90: 28-60; Gordin, Michael D. Red cloud at 
dawn: Truman, Stalin, and the end of hanatomic monopoly. New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux 
[forthcoming].
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The U.S. atomic monopoly was short-lived, and the window of opportunity 
for the American government to show itself generous with its radioactive 
resources was closing. 
Early in 1951, the Commission voted to expand the foreign radioisotope 
program. Foreigners would be permitted to purchase isotopes for industrial 
applications, as the British and Canadian programs allowed. In announcing 
the change, the AEC sought to assure the head of the JCAE, Senator Brien 
McMahon, that the newly broadened program «is wholly consistent with 
the paramount objective of assuring the common defense and security» 67. 
The press release for the policy was also carefully worded to allay public 
worries about the exports:
«There is nothing secret or evil about radioisotopes in the forms in 
which they are sold in this country and abroad. While their utilization 
cannot significantly advance the atomic energy programs of nations, they can 
contribute, and are contributing, significantly to advancements in basic science, 
medicine, agriculture and industry. As of today, isotopes constitute the single 
most important contribution of atomic energy to peacetime welfare.
Enlargement of our isotope export program is, we feel, in keeping with 
the foreign policy of the United States, which calls for aid to foreign nations 
in peacetime development, and, even in the absence of international control 
of atomic energy, constitutes a field in which international cooperation can 
be increased» 68.
The press release also emphasizes the role of training programs for foreign 
scientists in growing the demand for isotopes abroad. The Isotope School 
of the Oak Ridge Institute of Nuclear Studies at Oak Ridge, Tennessee, had 
accepted a limited number of foreign nationals in the late 1940s through 
1951 69.
 67. Pike, Sumner T. to: McMahon, Brien. 7 May 1951. Letter. Appendix B to AEC 231/16. AEC Secretary 
Records. Box 46. Folder 3. Foreign Distribution of Radioisotopes. Vol. 3.
 68. Proposed press release: AEC enlarges radioisotope export program. Appendix E to AEC 231/16. 
AEC Secretary Records. Box 46. Folder 3. Foreign Distribution of Radioisotopes. Vol. 3, p. 
16.
 69. Proposed press release, n. 68. John Krige has analyzed the importance of such training programs 
in association with Eisenhower’s Atoms for Peace initiative; see Krige, John. Techno-utopian 
dreams, techno-political realities. The education of desire for the peaceful atom. In: Gordin, 
Michael D.; Prakash, Gyan; Tilley, Helen, eds. Utopia-dystopia: Conditions of historical possibility. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press [forthcoming].
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The upshot of the restrictions that the AEC placed on radioisotope 
exports was that the Americans lost substantial market share —and thus 
political influence— as foreign purchasers turned instead to the British and 
Canadian governments. As Néstor Herran has shown, within a year of the 
commencement of the British export program, radioactive shipments abroad 
from Harwell exceeded those from Oak Ridge 70. An AEC memo from 
June 1951 conceded that the three governments had become regional, not 
global, isotope suppliers: «the British can, and for the most part do, furnish 
short-lived radioisotopes to Western European countries; we distribute 
these materials to Latin American countries» 71. If the U.S. had an edge, it 
was in the production of radiolabeled compounds, although the gap was 
being narrowed by the British national company, Amersham, which began 
offering radiolabeled compounds in 1949 72.
Because all three governments were subsidizing isotope sales, the U.S. 
could not actually compete on a cost basis —from the outset, the Canadian 
and British governments set their prices to match those of Oak Ridge. As 
the agency admitted, «Such differences in prices as do exist would not in 
themselves be the determining factor in choosing one country over another 
as a supplier. Differences in shipping costs are a most important economic 
consideration» 73. For non-economic considerations, the U.S. AEC was at 
a disadvantage on account of the complex diplomatic controls it exercised 
in the name of national security.
The association that conservatives crafted between foreign distribution of 
isotopes and lax national security was finally severed by Dwight Eisenhower. 
President Eisenhower’s «Atoms for Peace» speech at the end of 1953, with 
its core proposal that the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. both contribute fissionable 
materials to a program aimed at peaceful atomic energy, highlighted the 
longstanding emphasis on civilian benefits which had been emblematized 
by the radioisotope distribution program. The subsequent 1954 revision of 
the Atomic Energy Act relaxed the tight security restrictions of the original 
 70. Herran, Néstor. Spreading nucleonics: The Isotope School at the Atomic Energy Research 
Establishment, 1951–67. British Journal for the History of Science. 2006; 39: 569-586.
 71. AEC 231/17. 19 June 1951. AEC Secretary Records. Box 47. Folder 1. Foreign Distribution of 
Radioisotopes. Vol. 3. 
 72. Kraft, Alison. Between medicine and industry: Medical physics and the rise of the radioisotope 
1945–65. Contemporary British History. 2006; 20: 1-35.
 73. Pike, Sumner T. to: McMahon, Brien. 21 June 1951. Letter. AEC Secretary Records. Box 47. Folder 
1. Foreign Distribution of Radioisotopes. Vol. 3.
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legislation, and permitted companies to patent atomic technologies and 
license fissionable materials. This also served Eisenhower’s foreign policy 
agenda. Having failed to become the main supplier of radioisotopes in 
the global marketplace, the U.S. began negotiating agreements with other 
nations to provide them with the technologies and materials they needed 
to construct their own radioisotope-producing reactors. In this new phase 
of the Cold War, nuclear information and fissionable materials joined 
radioisotopes as instruments of political influence 74. 
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